The Department of Information Services

            The Department of Information Services is set up to provide a centralized clearinghouse of information for regional governments. It is “divided into three sections. The Computer Systems Section looked after hardware and existing system software and did any required ‘troubleshooting.’ The Operations Section handled information input and routine tasks such as the copying and distribution of computer-generated reports. On this section's payroll were the clerks in the department's many branch offices, as well as the data processors and computer operators at the central office. Finally there was the Applications Section, which was charged with maintaining and periodically upgrading the department's software.” (Case study, p. 1).  The senior administrative officer supervised all Sections and he reported back to the executive director.  For the early part of its existence, the Department’s central office maintained relatively tight control over the information sent out to governments that requested information, because it processed the forms filled out and sent them onto the Operations clerks who actually gathered and disseminated the information.  Long delays and a practical limitation of only supplying data caused pressure (following an election centering on efficiency in government) for the Department to upgrade its systems.  Paul Jitney, the head of Computer Systems recommended a proposal that would cut the operations staff in half and make the Applications team develop software to speed up access times.  Despite the Operations chief’s opposition to the proposal, DIS accepted it and implemented it for five years.  When Martha Dun, a relative newcomer to government and bureaucracy, became head of Applications, she did so in the midst of the micro revolution.  Instead of accessing applications through the central computer, many governments had micros that replaced the need for the mainframe.  Thus, the logon time, the measure by which the Director gauged departmental sustainability, was drastically decreased.  At a meeting ran in a very authoritarian fashion and based on seniority, the Director requested that Jitney—who basically stated, over Dun’s objection, that DIS should ignore micros—prepare a report on what could be done.  The head of Operations said that micros should be integrated into the overall system, and Dun thought this proposal made sense. 

Because Dun knew that Jitney’s report would be a death knell for the organization, she and the head of Operations prepared a substantial supplemental report and submitted it to the administrator. The administrator threw it in the circular file and told Dun to keep her mouth shut.

Basically, we have a collision of interests and attempt to concentrate power in the hands of bureaucrats who, in a shortsighted manner, are unwilling to make changes for the good of the organization.  The Director could control who spoke and when they spoke, and like the chief of staff in the White House, the administrator could control what the director saw.  If I were Dun, I would have tried to appeal to the Director in private following the meeting. Otherwise, she did what she could by building a sort of coalition with the head of Operations.  Have you ever worked for an executive like Brill before? What strategies did you find were successful in getting your point across? How would you have used the question period described in the meeting to make your point?

The Challenger Disaster and Organizational Thinking

Although the stakes were much higher and the eventual price was unimaginably tragic, NASA displayed many of the same barriers to learning caused by institutional norms for organizing and processing information as do many bureaucratic organizations.

NASA's decisionmaking process displays classic single-loop learning, in which it detected and corrected error (or failed to do so) in relation to an accepted set of operating norms.  To engage in double-loop learning, NASA would have had to challenge the accepted operating norms and determine whether or not they were appropriate.  This did not occur and, as a result, the operating norms of normalizing problems or anomalies, focusing on production, and structural secrecy continued to operate as barriers to learning.

Fragmented patterns of thought and action were rife in this case, causing different departments within the organization to operate with different views of the total picture of the situation.  Since the engineering department was separated from the safety department, it was impossible for both departments to have a total view of the situation and, in this case, anomalies had to be deemed 'serious enough' by the engineering department to even be brought to the safety department's attention.  This pattern of information-sharing (or lack thereof) could have the result of a disastrous malfunction that was never even brought to the safety department's attention.  This is all too common of bureaucratic organizations, where a 'silo mentality' is common and departments tend to engage in protective 'turf wars.'  Essential information can be obscured, be it intentionally or unintentionally, by these fragmented patterns of thought and action.  Seriousness of problems can be obscured as a way of protecting self and colleagues.

Normalization of anomalies was another barrier to learning that served as a contributing factor.  Small problems seemed to occur with every project, and the vast majority of time, production (launch) was achieved without a hitch.  This created a culture where the organizational norm was to minimize anomalies unless, for some reason, they were deemed 'serious enough' to report upward.  When this norm combined with the structural secrecy described above, the consequences could be disastrous.  Even after a major disaster, the institutional memory of the disaster seemed to fade and any change in institutional norms seemed to fade over time, as the organization moved back to a familiar pattern with long-accepted institutional norms.  The institutional structure remained complex, which contributed to continued fragmentation with regard to information sharing and decisionmaking.  And focus on production by way of successful launches continued.

Even in organizations where barriers to learning might not have consequences as drastic as the Challenger and Columbia disasters, organizational norms guide information processing and decisionmaking at every turn.  What are some instances where single loop thinking guided decisionmaking, and how did the institutional norms guide organizational decisionmaking?  In the alternative, have you experienced situations where double loop thinking were accomplished and the organizational norms were evaluated for appropriateness?

A Visit to McDonald's

(opener)

A visit to McDonald's will never be the same after reading this case.  McDonald's as represented in this case is truly operating as a machine.  In every aspect, as described by Bob, has a set way of being handled.  The restaurant itself is even laid out to be uniform in all respects.  Starting at the counter when the are greeted by an employee, you begin to notice that they all start off asking the same questions at the beginning of the order and at the end.  The food is prepared in the same way every time.  Employees are designated to certain roles and that is all they do.  They handle one task and take it to completion and then start it again.  Drinks are poured with the same amount of ice in the cup and condiments are added to sandwiches in equal amounts every time.  There is very little, if any deviation from the out lined plan.  Even managers have a set task for each day of the year.  McDonald's has created a machine and makes sure its employees are trained properly and well oiled (sorry about the pun). 

McDonald's success comes from many different aspects, but the ability to provide a product that is the same no matter where you are is the biggest one.  Their ability to recreate the same product in any location using the "machine" they have created has allowed them to become a staple in most cultures.  People in the United States or, in this instance, Canada can travel to any McDonald's and know they will receive the same quality product they received at home.  As the case study states, "After all, we don't know where else to go, or what their food's like."  McDonald's has created a name brand that will follow them wherever they go, and has achieved a status of iconic with its golden arches and fast food. 

Public service organizations have many different aspects to them and require different people and personalities to run them.  When you look at a local government, you see multiple aspects that mirror the McDonald's operations.  Public Works is one side where this is the case.  Employees are trained from the ground up learning one skill set before moving on to another.  As they succeed, they are given more and more responsibility.  They are given a set of standard operating procedures that explain how a job is suppose to be done and they very rarely deviate from that set of procedures.  Requests from citizens are usually responded with set answers that usually never deviate from what has been established in guidelines and protocols.  The opposite is true when looking at the administrative level of a small community.  The head administrator is allowed to deviate from the plan and make suggestions and change the plan when needed.  He looks into citizens requests and bends rules to fit the individual situation.  He plays more to the social aspect of making the citizens happy with the outcome.

In my opinion, there is some need to have set standards and regulations in place to make sure things are completed correctly, but I do understand that employees need to have a self-satisfying feel about their job if they are to perform at their highest potential.  I do not think that treating employees like they are cogs in a machine will allow them to reach their full potential and it would not benefit the organization to have people working below their potential.  Too many times people settle and unfortunately it is because the system pushes them to do so.  The organization need to strive to make employees want to be better so they are better employees and public servants.

How is the organization you work for like or not like a machine?  Do you think a public organization could be successful running as just a machine or do they need other aspects to fill the need of the citizens?  How many successful companies are run like this?